SLIGHTLY MORE REALISTIC PERSONAL PROBABIHITY IAN HACKING
Makerere University College A person required to risk money on a remote digit of it would, in order to comply fully with the theory [of personal probability] have to compute that digit, though this would really be wasteful if the cost of computation were more than the prize involved. For the postulates of the theory imply that you should behave in accordance with the logical implications of all that you know. Is it possible to improve the theory in this respect, making allowance within it for the cost of thinking, or would that entail paradox?* Like each of Professor Savage's difficulties in the theory of personal probability, his problem about the remote digit of rc is entirely general. It concerns logical consequence as much as logical truth: his theory implies that if e entails h you should be as confident of h as of e. His owvn example is one of three distinct cases which militate against this part of his theory. In his example there is a known algorithm for working out of the relevant logical implications, but it is too costly for sensible use. A second case arises when there is no known algorithm for finding out whether the hypothesis h follows from the evidence e. Perhaps there are two subcases: in the first, the algorithm is not known to anyone; in the second, it is not accessible to the person who is making decisions. In either case the person who is as confident of h as of e is, though lucky, not reasolnable, but prejudiced; a man who is less confident may be the sensible man who tailors his beliefs to the available evidence.
Intuitionist mathematicians offer ready examples for the first forn of t-he second case. Does 777 occur in the decimal expansion of n? According to classical logic, any analytical definition either entails that 777 occurs, or entails that it does not, but we know no procedure sure to settle which it is. Complete confidence in either outcome is absurd. Yet complete confidence is demanded by personalism. If it is hard to imagine real life betting on such a question, recall the 15th century algorithm competitions. When Tartaglia knew the algorithm for solving cubic equationis and Cardano did not, Cardano had to "risk money," or at least his reputation, on problems that could be solved only by an algorithm he did not know ( [6] , ch. 5).
A third case arises from undecideability. Suppose a man is to have a set of betting rates over a whole class of problems for which there exists no algorithm. It must be an infinite class because algorithms exists for all finite classes of problems. Such a man is prevented from systematically satisfying the demands of personal probability. For a concrete example, let our man have to bet about assertions of the form "F is a theorem of the predicate calculus," where F ranges over all well formed formulae of the calculus.
These three cases make distinct version of the difficulty suggested by Savage.
The third one, though it will appeal to logicians, might be discounted by a practical personalist on the grounds that we never do have to risk money over the whole range of an infinite undecideable class. Hence I shall attend mainly to the first two cases, although the third will also be kept in mind. The first and second cases do arise in serious practical matters. Many questions in probability theory are answered by Monte Carlo methods that yield only probable solutions with a range of uncertainty. Yet a computer techlnologist will often decide to use Monte Carlo methods: both when expensive exact solutions are theoretically available, and also when no algorithm for the exact solution is known. In either case he is rationally deciding to act against the axioms of personal probability. A slightly more realistic theory must show that his decision is reasonable. Savage fears that any theory which is, in this respect, more realistic, will "entail paradox." This is especially plausible in the first two cases, for although we expect the precise analysis of recursive functions to help with the third, no analysis is already tailored for the other two. The difficulty seems to arise from some feature of what Savage calls "logical implication." Philosophers know, to their cost, the difficulty of getting any intuitively adequate analysis of relations among logical truths. The best known analysis of logical implication, namely C. I. Lewis' theory of strict implication, says that a self-contradictory proposition entails everything ( [14] , p. 250). Many philosophers balk at that result, but none has circulated an alternative which is, at present, widely accepted. It is plausible to guess that attempts to patch up personalism will sink into the same quagmires that have, in my opinion, swallowed up students of entailment.
1.
A priori and a posteriori reasoning. Plausible though such defeatism is, I shall argue against it. The argument goes near many philosophical quagmires, but we can skirt most of them in the way which, as Savage reminds us, so many other philosophical difficulties are evaded by personalism. A main strand in the argument can be sent out at once. Personalism is, says Savage, a theory for policing one's own potential decisions and systems of belief. Hence we distinguish between the theory and what it is about. In logician's parlance personalism is a metatheory. It is about, in part, various beliefs that are represented by propositions. Some aspects of Savage's problem may stem from over-willing acceptance of philosophical dogmas about propositions and our knowledge of them.
In particular I do not believe that the theory should acknowledge any distinction between facts found out by a priort reasoning and those discovered a posteriori. I am not referring to the current controversy as to whether there is a sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. I insist only that actions based ultimately upon knowledge need not distinguish ways in which the knowledge is acquired.
Consider the problem of finding the surface of least area bounded by a closed curve in space. It is hard to establish even that there is a least area. Yet in the early 19th century the Belgian physicist Plateau could often answer by detennimng the filmn a soap bubble forms on a closed loop of wire; he knew enough about soap bubbles to be sure the film was of least area. The complete mathematical solutions had to wait for over a century ([4], p. 386 ). Yet the empirically obtained results should provide as much confidence for practical decisions as the later mathematical proofs-maybe more, considering several debacles that from time to time occurred in the calculus of variations! 'What matters to the decision maker is what he knows or can find out; philosophical distinctions among the means of discovery are of no moment.
Take a pair of examples directly related to Savage's problem about the remote digit of iT. Imagine a man taught binary notation, but not even told that it is a system of numbering. He is taught only the natural ordering of the binary numerals. He is also taught how to add and multiply in this notation, although he is not told what the operation means. He is asked to speculate on the relative magnitude of products of pairs of five-digit binary numbers. It does not matter to him much; say he risks no money at all, but can make a little every time he is right. His beliefs can be represented by betting odds in tle way that Savage has taught us. Suppose that considering any pair of products of two five-digit binary numbers, his betting rate is 0.2 on the two products being equal, and 0.4 on each of t-he other two alternatives.
This man, whom we shall recall from time to time in what follows, is to be compared with another: someone who is first introduced to the mysteries of underground city transport, say that of the city of London. He is asked questions like, "Are there more stops travelling between Gloucester Rd. and King's Cross on the Picadilly or on the Circle line?" His odds parallel those of the first man, the binary computer. The two have much in common. Their betting rates hardly fit the facts as we know them. In each case, an elementary algorithrm answers each question which can be put to them; each declines it as too expensive considering the trifling gains. In each case some "insight" short of working out complete answers would lead to more profitable betting odds.
Despite the parallel, personalism treats one man as sensible and the other as incoherent. We need a theory that puts both on a par. It should also exlain why each man should find out more before wagering, if investigation is cheap enough. In trying to lessen the formal distinction between the two men, a remark of Savage's may suggests a fallacy we should avoid. He says that 'the example about iT does not adequately express the utter impracticality of knowing our own minds in the sense implied by the theory." I believe the example about iT does not express the impracticality of knowing our own minds at all: it has nothing to do with knowing our own minds; it is a matter of knowing i. And our speculator on binary products may know his own mind full well; what he does not know is binary arithmetic.
2. Classical personalism. Personalists attribute probabilities to events, but Savage's problem arises out of logical implication, which is a relation between propositions. So it is natural to work in one of the formalisms that attribute probability to propositions rather than to events.
Classical personalism offers a theory of rational belief and reasonable decision. At any moment in his life a man will know a body of facts f. He is interested in some set of propositions. Associated with this set is a Boolean algebra A. Probf(h) is to be a number representing the person's personal probability for h, when he knows f; for short, his probability given f. In one behavioural analysis, confidence is measured by the least favourable rate at which the person will bet about h. This leads to a well known argument for what I shall call the static assumption of personalism: For any heA, and at least any f C A, Probf (h) is defined and satisfies the probability axioms. As de Finetti proved, the probability axioms give necessary and sufficient conditions that a person's odds not be open to a Dutch book, i.e. not open to a book against him which is guaranteed a net gain [7] . Perhaps other arguments for the static assumption are more profound. Many readers will prefer those of F.P. Ramsey . Formally the distinction is clear. The probability of h given f is a primitive to be circumscribed by the axioms of Kolmogorov. Conditional probability is defined as above. The latter is extraneous to the system, and introduced solely for convenience; the former is basic. I say the distinction is fundamental to personalism yet personalists never use it explicitly. They never write "f' as a subscript to probabilities, nor express the idea in other ways. Why then introduce it? Because it will be crucial to our treatment of Savage's problem, and also because it makes explicit something fundamental to that part of Savage's theory which leads one to call his work Bayesian. Let me explain this after stating an implicit assumption of personalists which connects conditional probability with probability given facts. I call it the dynamic assumption:
Probf,,re] (h) = Probf (h/e).
The meaning is as follows. Suppose I know only f. I judge that if I knew e as well, I would be confident of h to degree p; behaviourally this judgement is shown by the conditional bets I would place. Now I find out that e is the case. The dynamic assumption asserts that now my confidence in h is p, as behaviourally shown in a readiness to place unconditional bets. This assumption is not a tautology for personalism. It is a tautology for theories like Harold Jeffreys' [13] , where a unique probability is associated with any pair h,e. Those theories do not need our distinction between probability given evidence and conditional probability. But personalists do need the distinction, and do need the dynamic assumption.
Since the assumption seems never to be stated explicitly in the classic personalist studies, how dare I say it is needed? Because it is essential to that "model of how opinion is modified in the light of experience" to which Savage refers above. This requires a digression, but it is so important to understanding personalism, and my modification of it, that the point deserves a section of its own.
Conditional and given. Savage's model of modifying opinion employs Bayes' theorem; that is why we speak of Bayesians today. Savage has stated the theorem "'somewhat informally" in the following way (I use an innocent paraphrase of ([20], p. 15).
Prob(h/e) cc Prob(e/h) Prob(h) In words, the probability of h given the datum e is proportional to the product of the probabilty of observing e given h multiplied by the initial probability of h.
Well known properties of this theorem lead us to a model of learning from experience. My own catalogue of the properties, guilty of exactly the same confusion as I shall attribute to Savage's presentation, is given in ([9], ch.XIII). The idea of the model of learning is that Prob(h/e) represents one's personal probability after one learns e. But formally the conditional probability represents no such thing. If, as in all of Savage's work, conditional probability is a defined notion, then Prob (h/e) stands merely for the quotient of two probabilities. It in no way represents what I have learned after I take e as a new datum point. It is only when we make the dynamic assumption that we can conclude anything about learning from experience. To state the dynamic assumption we use probability given data, as opposed to conditional probability.
The conflation of two distinct concepts may explain why people favourable to personalism can say both that conditional probability is an "extraneous" defined notion, and also that, as D.V.Lindley puts it in discussing an address of Savage The equivocation can be explained but not excused by the fact that a man knowing e would be incoherent if the rates offered on h unconditionally differed from his rates on h conditional on e. But no incoherence obtains when we shift from the point before e is known to the point after it is known. Thus, suppose to begin with both h and e are uncertain. A man offers odds of p,q,r, and 1-p-q-r on he, -he, h-e and -h-e respectively. His conditional rates fit in with this. Then e is found out to be true. The man revises his rates, betting 1 on e, 0 on -e, and p+s/p+q+s on h, and q/p+q+s on -h for some positive s. These new rates show how much the man has "learned" from e. His learning violates the dynamic assumption. It is non-Bayesian. But since the man announces his post-e rates only after e is discovered, and simultaneously cancels his pre-e rates, there is no system for betting with him which is guaranteed success in the sense of a Dutch book. It is of no avail to express all rates as conditional: then the man's Prob(h/ef) before 4. The betting rate interpretation. Our digression into the concept of probability given facts was needed for our overall view of Savage's problem and its solution. For we propose a trivially Bayesian treatment of mathematical learning, in agreement with our view that learning mathematical facts, and learning empirical facts, are both learning facts. The model of how learning facts modifies opinion will be the same in each case, namely Bayesian. We can achieve this only by weakening the axioms for personal probability, but in such a way that no practical application of the classical theory is impeded. For a hint of how to proceed, re-examine the betting rate interpretation, where Probf(h) = p if and only if p is the largest number such that for any relatively small S I would exchange pS for the right to collect S if h is true, and nothing if h is false.
Under the usual interpretation of a betting rate, de Finetti's theorem is valid: betting rates must satisfy the probability axioms or else be open to a Dutch book. But the usual interpretation involves a trifling idealization. In real life betting I will not collect on h merely if it is true. It must be seen to be true.-The bettors (or their heirs) must find out that h is true, or at worst abide by the decision of a trusted arbiter who claims to know about h. This idea has, I think, been implicit in de Finetti's insistence that we can only bet on hypotheses of the sort that can be settled in finite time. But that insistence is not enough, for only a few of the hypotheses that can be settled in theory are ever in fact settled. Even if something can be in principle settled but in fact never is, there will be no pay-offs.
More realistically my personal probability for h must be measured by p when p is the largest number such that I will contract with another party as follows. I agree to pay him pS if we find out that h is false. He agrees to pay me S in exchange for pS if we find out that h is true. No money changes hands until we settle the truth value of h. Of course like any other contract the "we" is less than literal: contracts can be inherited, bought, or adjudicated. But we discard the custom of leaving the stake in the hands of a bookmaker until the issue is settled: that custom is due to human dishonesty and has nothing essential to do with betting.
With this reinterpretation in mind, examine two of the probability axioms, say in a form adapted from Shimony's [21] .
( [14], p.l24) . This implicit falling back on possibility should make us prick up our ears. Aristotle had a scale of modes: impossible, possible, probable, necessary. It is a tradition, which I do not admire, always to consider this as a scale of logical possibility, logical probability, etc. Savage snapped tradition by going to an opposite extreme: personal probability. Perhaps he gets into trouble because he is not completely radical. Just as logical probability is related to logical possibility, so personal probability demands a concept of personal possibility.
There is nothing sacred about logical possibility. We know how Quine has mocked it ([16], ch.1,2) . A recent attempt to define what we commonly mean by possibility argues that though the concept is "objective" it falls short of logical possibility and is an epistemic concept [10] . That work was a by-product of trying to define "objective" probability short of logical probability. Likewise some concept of personal possibility should be a by-product of personal probability. It is not realistic to permit unending iteration of sentential operations, for there is an upper bound to the length of the sentences one can understand. A more realistic "personal language" would be the intersection of the closure under sentential operations, with the class of sentences a person understands. This can be characterized artificially, e.g. by limiting the sentences to 10,000 or fewer symbols. But I know of no difficulty in personal probability caused by ceaseless iteration, and I know no formal charactelization of intelligibility which is not hopelessly artificial. Hence I shall not strive for realism in this matter.
We may notice, without elaboration, that tying personal probability to a personal language of sentences, or of intelligible sentences, makes one defect of personalism more transparent. Evidently in this model we have amply idealized this man's knowledge, but even so, not up to the point of classical personalism. Specifically, we were concerned with this stupid man's betting rates on the 164 elements of the form mXn > jXk, and on the 164 elements of the form mXn = fXk, where m,nj, and k are fivedigit binary numbers. A man can be consistent with the axioms of slightly more realistic personal probability if he assigns a betting rate of 0.4 on each inequality, and 0.2 on each equality, except, (to give him minimum good sense) if m and n are the same as j and k, when he plumps for equality, and if m > j while n >k (and the like), when he bets solidly on the appropriate inequality. Although he cannot assign arbitrary odds to remaining elements of his language, there is a wide range of assignments that leaves him consistent with the axioms of slightly more realistic personal probability. Such a man is stupid, but speaking personally not much stupider than me. Personally, I would give lower odds for equality, larger for the inequalities, but otherwise my behaviour would not differ much. I know hardly any binary arithmetic.
9. A hierarchy. According to how we construe "possible" in the axioms stated above we get a lattice of theories which includes the points in this list.
1. Realistic personalism. Possible = personally possible = not known to be false. There are many more ways to fill in this epistemological list. People who are concerned with Savage's problem, and annoyed by my harsh examiner's sense of knowledge, will want to find more plausible points between 1 and 3. I hope they succeed. I must first show that even 1 evades some criticisms that might arise from devotion to 5. If you have a better theory than 1, which falls short of 5, there is every reason to expect that it too will avoid these criticisms. I have three criticisms in mind: the objection that anything short of 5 is too weak for personalism, a Dutch book objection, and the objection that anything less than 5 permits logical sloth. Each objection is unsound. (2) . Note that we are using a degenerate case of the dyiamic assumption; the realist's reasoning can be represented as an application of Bayes' theorem. As an exercise one can apply this story to the model of the binary bettor when he takes the trouble to work out some binary products.
11. What about the Dutch Book argument? It is said that necessaiy and sufflcient conditions for a set of betting rates to escape a Dutch book is that they satisfy the classical axioms. We remarked earlier how this theorem fails for a more realistic betting rate interpretation. But even more skepticism needs to be expressed. I quote de Finetti's original formulation:
Once an individual has evaluated the probabilities of certain events, two cases can present themselves: either it is possible to bet with him in such a way as to be assured of gaining, or else this possibility does not exist. In the first case one clearly should say that the evaluation of the probabilities given by this individual contains an incoherence, an intrinsic contradiction ([71, p. 103).
Taken literally, the words are not quite right. For in order to bet with a person so as to be assured of winning, all that is required is that I know more than he does. If you bet on the outcome of a coin, but I know it is double-headed while you do not, and you offer odds on both heads and tails, I shall bet against tails and be assured of winning. But you are not incoherent or intrinsically inconsistent; you had the bad luck to bet with a crook.
It will be protested that I quibble: of course de Finetti meant "logically assured." Exactly such an interpretation is guaranteed for example by Shimony's definitions [21] , although few other writers have been quite as careful as he. But I do not quibble. I urge that de Finetti's actual words are closer to an appropriate definition of coherence than the logician's gloss on them. Obviously I am not incoherent merely if someone knowing more than I can bet with me so as to be assured of winning. But, I contend, a man is incoherent if a person knowing no more than that man does is assured of winning.
If this is correct, it follows that a definition of incoherence must be tied to a definition of knowledge. Since no precise sense of knowledge is stronger than the examiner's sense, we want the following theorem. Suppose X knows no more (in the examiner's sense) than Y; then if Y's betting rates satisfy the slightly more realistic axioms, X cannot bet with Y in such a way that X knows (in the examiner's sense) that he will win from Y. This theorem holds.
Every stronger sense of "knowledge" will determine both a stronger definition of incoherence and a stronger set of probability axioms; thus whatever analysis you give to knowledge which takes you up the list from theory 1, you will discover a corresponding Dutch book theorem. The theorem does not discriminate among points on an epistemological list.
What about logic?
We can surely insist that we do some logic: does not the slightly more realistic theory excuse a man from any cogent reasoning whatsoever? No. In the classical theory, the Dutch book argument is used to club a man into reasoning. There may be a better club to hand.
Notice that even for classical personalism, we need more than the Dutch book argument to make a man open his eyes and collect the information around him Since realistic personalism makes no distinction between finding out logical and empirical facts, we will require the same reason for harvesting logical information as for collecting empirical information. tion of 80c. But our man may also undertake a calculating strategy: calculate which product is greater and bet accordingly. How does a calculation cost? Every calculation is a sequence of detachments, at least as we have constructed our model bettor. Now applying modus ponens is not simply a matter of detaching q from p and p D q; in the course of a significant calculation you must select the right p's and q's and that is not so easy. Indeed for me it is so time consuming that I personally set a price of 25c on every appropriate application of modus ponens needed by the bi'nary computer. Now let u,, be the number of occurrences of the digit one in n, and U?k the same for k. As we have set up the model of our bettor, then, assuming he has efficient axioms for equality, he requires un -I detachments to evaluate mXn, and Uk -1 for jXk; once he has evaluated each product, he requires two more detachments to be able to infer their relative magnitude. Thus it requires u,, + uk detachments in all.
The subjective expectation of any simple strategy, or mixture thereof, is 80c. The expected gross profit of the calculating strategy is $2.40. Hence it is sensible to calculate when the cost of doing so is less than $1.60; that is to say, when there are six or fewer occurrences of one in n and k together. When there are seven, it is better not to calculate.
14. The cost of police work. We called personalism a metatheory whose objects are beliefs and potential decisions. Our last calculation allowed for the cost of object level thinking. None of the costed detachments involved probability theory. We who look down on the binary bettor can say what his best strategy is. But personalism is for policing one's own decisions. Policing the bettor is not the same as the bettor policing himself. For among his costs will be what, in this special case, is the high cost of police work. He has to think harder to discover his best 
